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ABSTRACT
COORDINATION OF A TWO LEVEL SUPPLY CHAIN
WITH TWO SUBSTITUTABLE ITEMS
Ag˘cagu¨l Yılmaz
M.S. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Prof. U¨lku¨ Gu¨rler
December 2004
This study deals with a single period newsboy type inventory problem
with two products which can be substituted if one of them is out of stock
in a two level supply chain. It is allowed to return some or all of the unsold
products to the manufacturer with some credit. The expected chain profit, the
expected retailer and the manufacturer profit expressions are derived under
general conditions. Special cases are inspected to investigate the conditions
under which channel coordination is achieved. It is demonstrated that channel
coordination can not be achieved if full credit and full returns are allowed.
Key words: inventory, channel coordination, return contracts.
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O¨ZET
BI˙RBI˙RI˙ YERI˙NE DEG˘I˙S¸TI˙RI˙LEBI˙LEN I˙KI˙ U¨RU¨N I˙C¸EREN
SATIM YAPISININ ANALI˙ZI˙
Ag˘cagu¨l Yılmaz
Endu¨stri Mu¨hendislig˘i Bo¨lu¨mu¨ Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. U¨lku¨ Gu¨rler
Aralık 2004
Bu c¸alıs¸mada biri bittig˘inde dig˘erinin satın alınabildig˘i iki u¨ru¨n ic¸eren
iki kademeli bir tedarik zincirinde tek do¨nemli bir envanter problemi
incelenmis¸tir. Satılmayan u¨ru¨nlerin bir kısmının perakendeciden u¨reticiye belli
bir kredi karsılıg˘ında iade edilmesine izin veren bir model olus¸turulmus¸tur.
Bu yapı altında beklenen toplam kar, u¨retici ve perakendeci kar fonksiy-
onları tu¨retilmis¸tir. U¨retici ve perakendeci arasında koordinasyona izin
veren kos¸ulları bulmak ic¸in bazı o¨zel durumlar incelenmis¸tir. Satılmayan
tu¨m u¨ru¨nlerin tam para kars¸ılıg˘ı iade edildig˘i durumlarda koordinasyonun
sag˘lanmadıg˘ı go¨sterilmis¸tir.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler . Geri do¨nu¨s¸u¨m antlas¸maları.
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Supply chain management and contracts between levels of a supply chain have
gained considerable attention in the literature in the last decade. A simple
supply chain structure with a single product consists of an upstream party, the
manufacturer, and a downstream party, the retailer. The retailer orders the
product from the manufacturer in advance of a selling season with stochastic
demand. The manufacturer produces after receiving the retailer‘s order and
delivers his production to the retailer at the start of the selling season. The
manufacturer produces the product at a constant unit cost and charges the
retailer a wholesale/transfer payment. The retailer, in turn, sells the product
at a unit price. Therefore, supply chain activities begin with a customer order
and end when a customer is satisfied.
In this study a simple supply chain structure with a single retailer and
a manufacturer, is considered for two perishable products which can be
substituted for each other with fixed probabilities. The retailer is also allowed
to return some products to the manufacturer according to the contract between
the retailer and the manufacturer. The aim is to analyse the system to achieve
channel coordination.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 2
There are two main control structures for a supply chain. One of them is
the centralized and, the other is the decentralized control structure. Supply
chain profit is the total profit to be shared across all supply chain stages. If
all decisions are made by a single decision maker with access to all available
information, then the total expected supply chain profit is maximized. This is
referred to as central control. The resulting total expected profit is described
as centralized total expected profit. However, the supply chain members are
primarily concerned with optimizing their own objectives. This means neither
the manufacturer nor the retailer is in a position to control the entire supply
chain, and each has his own incentives and state of information. This is
referred to as a decentralized control structure, with resulting decentralized
total expected profit.
A main question in supply chain management is how to increase the supply
chain performance. The answer to this question helps to understand why the
retailer and the manufacturer make certain contract. Optimal supply chain
performance requires the execution of a precise set of actions to increase the
total supply chain profits. However, those actions are not always in the interest
of the members in the supply chain as in the decentralized case, resulting in
poor performance.
A contract contains specifications of quantity, price, time and quality. A
necessary condition for the adoption of any contractual agreement is that both
parties ultimately benefit. One of the advantages of a contract is to share the
risk between the retailer and the manufacturer. This is common in contracts.
The risk sharing objective focuses on how decentralized total expected profit
is to be split between the retailer and the manufacturer. The risks arise from
various sources of uncertainty, e.g. market demand, selling price, process yield,
product quality, delivery time, and exchange rates. As mentioned in Tsay,
Nahmias and Agrawal [23],”suppose that the retailer is required to transmit
sales forecasts to the manufacturer. These forecasts are intended to help the
manufacturer to make capacity and materials purchasing decisions. However,
in most cases no commitment is attached to these forecasts. As a result, the
manufacturer assumes a large portion of the risk of demand uncertainty. Not
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only might the retailer cancel orders if demand is lower than anticipated, there
is an incentive for the retailer to deliberately inflate forecasts as a form of
insurance.” Minimum purchase agreements or penalties for returns are often
included in contracts to protect the manufacturer against this behavior.
Contracts also facilitate long-term partnerships. Another example given
in Tsay [23] is as follows:”Intel might be willing to sell a large portion of its
production of a new generation of microprocessors to a single computer maker,
such as Dell. The microprocessor may sell for a higher price in open market.
However, Intel’s motivation would be to build long-term relationship in the
hope that Dell would be a volume purchaser for many years.”
Contracts make the terms of the relationship explicit. Each party’s
expectations on lead times, on-time delivery rates and product quality are
made legally concrete.
Coordination among the retailer and the manufacturer is a very important
issue in supply chain management. Contracts also provide the system-wide
performance improvement. The objective is to bring decentralized expected
profit closer to centralized expected profit. This is also referred to as the
channel coordination objective. If decentralized expected profit is equal to
centralized expected profit then the channel efficiency is said to be equal to
one. In other words, the customer’s order quantity is equal to the production
quantity of a manufacturer that both produces as well as sells the products.
The parameter set determination is important to achieve channel coordination.
There are many studies in literature related to contracts in supply chain
management. The main concepts in these papers can be classified as follows
as in Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal [23]:
• Specification of decision rights
• Pricing
• Minimum purchase commitments
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• Quantity flexibility
• Buyback or return policies
• Allocation rules
The literature review of the above concepts can be seen in the review paper
Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal [23]. Only some papers related to these concepts
are referred here. The literature of specification of decision rights can be
classified into three groups. Most of the multi-echelon inventory studies of
specification of decision rights is on central control, e.g. Clark and Scarf [1],
Rosling [12]. Then, the literature is followed by considering how to facilitate
the shift from centralized control to decentralized control. (e.g. Lee and Whang
[21], Porteus and Whang [14]). Finally, others focus on solutions which transfer
decision rights among the various independent agents, see e.g. Blair and Lewis
[16]. Another concept is pricing. In most of the traditional inventory models,
price paid by the retailer to the manufacturer is fixed. However, more recently,
pricing is considered as to be modified by the retailer or both the retailer
and the manufacturer. Therefore, both parties have considered the use of
quantity discounting as a coordination mechanism discussed in Monahan [8],
Lee and Rosenblatt [10]. A main paper considering the role of pricing in channel
coordination is by Jeuland and Shugan [6]. They compared the optimality
conditions with and without coordination. Other studies with pricing are
extensions of this study. In traditional studies, the retailer can order any
quantity from the manufacturer at any time. However, this is undesirable from
the manufacturer‘s point of view for a variety of reasons. The most important
reason is the bullwhip effect. The retailer makes no order for a long time due
to waiting for the cumulative demand to become sufficiently large. This causes
an increase in demand variance. So, minimum purchase agreement can be a
solution to this problem. Moreover, a minimum purchase commitment may
also require special pricing terms to attract the retailer. In fact, more than one
of these categories are included in many studies. The minimum commitment
per period is studied by many researchers, e.g. Anupindi and Akella [15].
In quantity flexibility, the retailer may deviate from the minimum purchase
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commitment. Three questions may arise from quantity flexibility: How should
the retailer behave given the available flexibility, how should the manufacturer
behave given the flexibility promised the retailer and what would be the cost
and the benefit to each party of changes to parameters of the agreement. In
the literature, these three questions are tried to be answered. The last issue
is allocation rules. Allocation issues arise when multiple retailers compete
for a product. There are mainly two papers, Cachon and Lariviere [18] and
Cachon and Lariviere [19]. Cachon and Lariviere [18] model a single-period,
single supplier, multi-retailer supply chain where the supplier‘s production
capacity is limited and each retailer‘s stocking level is private information.
The other paper considers a one-supplier, two-retailer supply chain in a two-
period environment. These two papers show the effect of allocation on supply
chain behavior and performance. But, they do not specify what allocation
policies might be optimal.
In Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal [23], some types of supply contracts are
mentioned to coordinate the newsvendor and to divide the supply chain‘s profit.
Some examples of contracts are sales rebate contract, quantity flexibility,
wholesale price contracts, buyback contract, and revenue sharing contract.
Each one coordinates by inducing the retailer to order more than he would
with just a wholesale price contract. Quantity flexibility contract induces
the retailer by giving the retailer some refund when demand is lower than
order quantity. Only some percentage of unsold products can be returned
for full credit to the manufacturer in quantity flexibility contract. The sales
rebate contract induces the retailer by giving the retailer some incentive when
demand is greater than a threshold t. So, the retailer purchases the units sold
above threshold t for less than their cost of production. In revenue-sharing
contract, the manufacturer gets some credit per unit sold to the retailer plus
the retailer gives the manufacturer some percentage of his revenue. In buyback
contract, all unsold products can be returned to the manufacturer for partial
credit. In fact, revenue sharing is equivalent to buyback contract when some
mathematical relationship is satisfied between the percentage shared and the
partial credit.
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To summarize, there are a large number studies relating to the coordinating
contracts. However, it is not easy to set the conditions under which one contract
must be preferred over the other. A simple contract is particularly desirable
if the contract‘s efficiency is high (the ratio of supply chain profit with the
contract to the supply chain‘s optimal profit) and if the contract designer gets
the lion‘s share of supply chain profit.
When the number of products that the retailer stocks is large, stock control
becomes more difficult. Especially if these products can be substituted for each
other with a fixed probability. Moreover, the retailer may return some or all
unsold product to the manufacturer, possibly for only partial credit. There
are several motivations for a manufacturer to accept a returned product. A
manufacturer may want to have a return policy to enhance the retailer for the
popularity of his products. Alternatively, a manufacturer may want to accept
returns to rebalance inventory among retailers when there are more than one
retailer.
Before getting started to explaining the model considered in this study, let
us mention about the related literature. There are many papers related to
return strategies and substitutability. One of the earliest studies for channel
coordination and buyback contracts is Pasternack [9]. In Pasternack [9], a
manufacturer produces a single product for sale to a retailer, the product
has a relatively short shelf or a demand life, and the retailer places only
one order with the manufacturer. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price
and the market selling price is fixed, so the only decision for the retailer is
the order quantity. The classical newsboy setting is considered, in which
the demand is for a single period and the inventory is not carried forward
into the future. The single-period inventory model is frequently used to
analyze stocking levels for perishable or short shelf-life products. Typical
products are newspapers, seasonal items, fashion items, etc. Using a single-
period inventory model, Pasternack [9] finds that neither a policy allowing for
unlimited returns at full credit, nor the one allowing for no returns is efficient to
achieve channel coordination. Pasternack [9] determines that the coordination
of the channel can be achieved by a buyback contract allowing for full returns
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at a partial credit. The efficient prices can be set in a way that guarantees
Pareto improvement. In order to implement an efficient contract, guaranteeing
Pareto improvement is necessary in order to insure retailer‘s participation. In
Pasternack [9] different channel coordinating prices paid by the retailer to the
manufacturer per unit and credits per unit paid by the manufacturer to the
retailer per unit for returned products lead to different ways of splitting the
channel profit between the manufacturer and the retailer. However, how does
or should the manufacturer pick implementable prices is not addressed.
In another paper, Lau [22] suggests a model for designing the pricing
and return-credit strategy for a monopolistic manufacturer of single-period
products. The manufacturer determines the unit price to be charged from the
retailer (C) and the unit credit to be given to the retailer for units returned (V)
given the unit manufacturing cost, the unit retail sale price, the risk attitude
of himself and the retailer and the demand uncertainty. The order quantity is
set by the retailer after taking the manufacturer‘s decisions. Also, retailer has
an enforceable minimum profit requirement. The major purpose of the study
is to see whether it is desirable from the manufacturer’s perspective to grant
return credits and how the manufacturer should coordinate the pairs of credit
and price with changing channel efficiencies. These channel efficiencies show
how much the channel coordination is achieved. The findings derived from the
model are:
• The manufacturer can usually design a C,V that gives himself the lion‘s
share of the profit unless an external force supports the retailer
• The optimal return policy can range from ‘no returns allowed‘ to
‘unlimited returns with full credit‘ depending on the risk attitudes of
the retailer and the manufacturer.
In another study by Padmanabhan and Png [20], a manufacturer uses a
buyback contract to manipulate the competition between retailers. Buyback
contract intensifies the degree of competition between the retailers. More
intense retail competition means lower retailer prices, greater sales. As a result,
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manufacturer gets larger profits. Emmons and Gilbert [24] study buyback
contracts with a retail price setting newsvendor. In their study, the retail
commit to both a stocking quantity and a price at which to sell a product prior
to the selling season. Donohue [27] studies buyback contracts in a model with
multiple production opportunities. Also, the model improves demand forecasts.
In fact, there are substantial literature on buyback contracts. However, the
studies by Pasternack [9] and Lau [22] are more related to our problem.
Regarding the inventory control of substitutable products, one of the early
papers is by Ignall and Veinott [2]. They developed conditions under which the
myopic solution ( a solution of minimizing expected cost in the current period
line) is optimal also in the long run. Their result can be applied to our problem
to determine the long run optimum. We do not deal with the difficult multi-
period problem. However, if one is interested in the multi-period problem,
then it is possible to deal by using the paper of Ignall and Veinott [2]. Their
work was extended by Deuermeyer [5]. He studied a multi-product inventory
system with interdependent demand , showed that the rate of substitution is
age dependent.
McGillivray and Silver [4] investigated the effects of the substitutability on
stocking control rules and inventory costs for the case in which all items have
the same unit variable cost and shortage penalty. Their model assumed that if
an item is out of stock there is a fixed probability of the customer to substitute
another available item. They considered the case of total substitutability
(probability of substitution equaling one) and compared this with the case
of no substitutability to obtain limits on the potential benefits achievable from
substitution. Focusing on the two item case they used simulation to develop
costs as well as a heuristic approach for establishing order up to levels. Their
results indicated that a consequence of full substitutability would be a decrease
in the total optimal order quantity. However, substitutability would be of
little consequence when the number of substitutable items stocked is low and
probabilities that customers will accept substitutes small.
Parlar and Goyal [7] studied a two product single period inventory model
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in which substitution occurs in a probabilistic sense. That is, if one good is
out of stock but there is a surplus of other good at the end of the period,
the substitution will occur with some constant probability. Their model also
assumed that revenue received for a good is unaffected by the substitution.
They showed that the total profit function is concave for a wide variety
of problem parameters and developed necessary conditions for an optimal
solution.
Parlar [11] used a game theoretic approach to model two independent
decision makers whose products can be substituted if one becomes out of stock.
He showed that there exist a Nash equilibrium solution.
Pasternack and Drezner [13] considered a stochastic model for two products
which have a single period inventory structure and which can be used as
substitutes for each other. Substitution occurs with probability one, but at
a different revenue level. They proved that the expected profit function is
concave. This allows to find optimum stocking levels for the case of single
substitution with that there is no substitution. They found that if revenue
obtained from substitution of one product exceeds the other product, one will
order more from that product. They demonstrated that for the case of single
substitution total optimum order quantities can decrease or increase with the
substitution revenue depending on the problem parameters.
Matthews [3] suggested a model for the manufacturer to optimize his
stocking strategy for a periodic review/replenishment system for multi-period
case. The model was two stage linear program for n items and there was
demand transfer among them. Optimal replenishment cycle is taken as
constant and known to see how the net profit changes. It is seen that rates of
sale depends on primary demands of items, inventory position of other items
for a state, and percentage of demand transferring from an out of stock item
to an other item.
Drezner, Gurnani and Pasternack [17] presented an economic order quantity
model when two products are available and one can be substituted for the
other. They considered three cases, when there is no substitution between
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the products, when there is full substitution between the products and when
there is partial substitution between the products. It is observed that full
substitution is never optimal; only partial substitution or no substitution may
be optimal. However, they considered the full substitution as the demands
for both products are combined to create one order for one product only. This
means order quantity of one product is zero. Also, they presented an algorithm
to compute the optimal order quantities.
Gurnani and Drezner [25] considered a deterministic nested substitution
problem where there are multiple products which can be substituted one for
the other. The trade-off in the substitution process is as follows: a cheaper,
more generic product can be substituted for a more expensive and less generic
product by incurring an extra cost of transformation. On the other hand,
less generic product is hold in inventory for higher holding inventory cost.
They formulated the problem to determine the optimal run-out times, so to
determine the optimal order and substitution quantities.
Smith and Agrawal [26] developed a probabilistic demand model for items
capturing the effects of substitution and a methodology for selecting item
inventory models so as to maximize total expected profit, subject to given
resource constraints. Inventory optimization includes both the selection of
which items to stock and the stock levels for each item. They gave examples
to see the behavior of the optimal inventory policies, using negative binomial
demand distribution. The major insights are as follows: optimal assortment
and inventory levels are significantly effected by substitution; policies derived
from ignoring substitution effects can be less profitable than those that
incorporating substitution effects; substitution effects can reduce the optimal
assortment size and with substitution effects, it is not always optimal to stock
the most popular items, even when all items are equally profitable.
In this thesis, we consider a simple supply chain structure with a retailer
and a manufacturer, for two substitutable products According to the contract
between the manufacturer and the retailer, the retailer is allowed to return some
unsold products to the manufacturer. General expressions are derived for the
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expected total profit of the supply chain, the expected profit of the retailer
and the expected profit of the manufacturer. Some special cases, regarding the
substitution probabilities and return proportions are considered to obtain the
necessary conditions for channel coordination. Negative binomial distribution
is considered for numerical studies.
It is found that when substitutability is concerned either one-way or two-
way full substitution (a policy of allowing for unlimited returns for partial
credit) is system optimal. As in Pasternack [9], it is observed that full credit
full return contracts can not achieve system coordination.
Organization of the thesis is as follows:
In Chapter 2, the general model is introduced and the expected profit
expressions are provided. In Chapter 3, special cases are considered and
necessary conditions to achieve channel coordination are obtained. Results
of our numerical study are presented in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5
concluding remarks are made and future research directions are stated.
Chapter 2
General Model
In this study, we consider a single period newsboy type inventory problem with
two substitutable products in a two level supply chain, consisting of a retailer
and a manufacturer.
Among several contract types that are discussed in the literature, we focus
on the case where the retailer is allowed to return some or all of the unsold
products to the manufacturer with partial or full credit. Our set-up is similar to
that of Pasternack [9] except that we generalize his study for two substitutable
products.
We first derive the expressions for the total expected channel profit,
manufacturers expected profit and the retailer‘s expected profit under general
model parameters. We then investigate the special cases for channel
coordination. In particular, we say that coordination is achieved if the retailer‘s
order quantity is the same as the production quantity of the manufacturer that
both produces and directly sells to the market as in Pasternack [9].
Throughout the study we assume that the original demand to each product
is satisfied first. If there is excess inventory from one product and there is
excess demand in the other, a portion of this excess demand is satisfied from
the other available product.
12
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Let us first introduce the notation. For product i, i = 1, 2; the
manufacturing cost is ci and di is the price paid by the retailer to the
manufacturer. Credit paid by the manufacturer to the retailer for returned
item i is denoted by si. Qi is the order quantity for product i to be determined
by the retailer. The percentage of the order quantity Qi which the retailer
can return to the manufacturer for a credit of si per item i is Ri. X is the
random demand for item 1 with density (or probability mass function) f(x) and
distribution function F (x). Y is the random demand for item 2 with density
(or probability mass function) g(y) and distribution function G(y). A customer
will accept a unit of item 2 when item 1 is out of stock with probability a for
sale price p2. The probability of accepting a unit of item 1 when item 2 is out
of stock for a sale price p1 is b. We also assume that;
ci ≤ di ≤ pi (1)
There is no salvage cost and goodwill cost unlike in Pasternack(11).
In the following sections, the expressions for the expected total supply chain
profit, the retailer‘s expected profit and the manufacturer‘s expected profit are
obtained.
2.1 Total Supply Chain Expected Profit
Using the above notation and the assumptions, we aim to derive the expression
for the total expected profit of the supply chain, which will be denoted
by EPT (Q1, Q2). Total expected profit of the supply chain is obtained by
considering the case where the producer sells the products directly to the
customer and is not involved in any contracts with a retailer.
Note that, initially, when Q1,Q2 units are produced, a cost of c1Q1 + c2Q2
is incurred. In addition, we have considered six profit expressions pia, pib,
pic, pid, pie, pif over their respective regions when respective demands (X =
x, Y = y) are realized as described below. The derivation of the expression
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for EPT (Q1, Q2) can be more easily followed by referring to Figure D.1 in
Appendix-D.
In region a, demands for both products are less than their inventory levels
and profit expression is;
pia = p1x + p2y x ≤ Q1, y ≤ Q2 (a)
In region b, demand for product 1 exceeds its inventory level but the excess
demand can be fully satisfied by product 2 and profit expression is;
pib = p2y+p2a(x−Q1)+p1Q1 x ≥ Q1, y ≤ Q2, a(x−Q1) < Q2−y (b)
In region c, demand for product 1 exceeds its inventory level and the excess
demand can only be partially satisfied by product 2 and profit expression is;
pic = p1Q1 + p2Q2 x ≥ Q1, y ≤ Q2, a(x−Q1) > Q2 − y (c)
In region d, demands for both products are greater than their inventory
levels and profit expression is;
pid = p1Q1 + p2Q2 x ≥ Q1, y ≥ Q2 (d)
In region e, demand for product 2 exceeds its inventory level and the excess
demand can only be partially satisfied by product 1 and profit expression is;
pie = p1Q1 + p2Q2 x ≤ Q1, y ≥ Q2, Q1 − x < b(y −Q2) (e)
In region f , demand for product 2 exceeds its inventory level and can be
fully satisfied by product 1 and profit expression is;
pif = p1x + p1b(y −Q2) + p2Q2 x ≤ Q1, y ≥ Q2, Q1 − x > b(y −Q2) (f)
Total supply chain expected profit expression, EPT (Q1, Q2), is obtained by
integrating these profit expressions over their respective regions plus −c1Q1 −
c2Q2. Proof of this derivation is given in Appendix A.
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Proposition 2.1.1:
Under the assumed model, the total expected profit of the supply chain is
given by:













)d(x) + (p1 − c1)Q1 (1)
2.2 Retailer‘s Expected Profit
We consider a hierarchical situation in which the retailer determines the order
quantity to purchase from the manufacturer. The retailer‘s expected profit,
EPR(Q1, Q2), is derived below. The derivation is based on considering the
profit in several realizations as seen in Figure D.2 in Appendix-D.
Suppose the retailer orders Q1 and Q2 units of products with a cost given
by d1Q1 + d2Q2. We consider the profit in eleven possible regions from a to k
according to the realized demand (X = x, Y = y).
In region a , x ≤ (1−R1)Q1, y ≤ (1−R2)Q2, demand for product 1 is less
than (1−R1).Q1 and demand for product 2 is less than (1−R2).Q2 and unsold
ones are returned to the manufacturer for the permitted return percentage R1
and R2 and profit expression is;
pia = p1x + p2y + R1Q1s1 + R2Q2s2 (a)
In region b, x ≤ (1−R1)Q1, (1−R2)Q2 ≤ y ≤ Q2, demand for product 1 is
less than (1−R1).Q1 and demand for product 2 is in between (1−R2).Q2 and
Q2) and unsold product 1 is returned for permitted return percentage R1), all
unsold product 2 are returned to the manufacturer and profit expression is;
pib = p1x + p2y + R1Q1s1 + (Q2 − y)s2 (b)
In region c, y ≥ Q2, Q1 − (x + b(y − Q2)) > R1Q1, demand for product
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2 exceeds its inventory level but the excess demand can be fully satisfied by
product 1 and R1.Q1 amount of product 1 is returned to the manufacturer and
profit expression is;
pic = p1x + p1(b(y −Q2)) + R1Q1s1 + p2Q2 (c)
In region d, y ≥ Q2, Q1 − (x + b(y − Q2)) < R1Q1, x + b(y − Q2) < Q1,
demand for product 2 exceeds its inventory level but the excess demand can
be fully satisfied by product 1 and all unsold amount of product 1 is returned
to the manufacturer, and profit exxpression is;
pid = p2Q2 + p1(x + b(y −Q2)) + (Q1 − x− b(y −Q2))s1 (d)
In region e, y ≤ (1 − R2)Q2, (1 − R1)Q1 ≤ x ≤ Q1, demand for product
1 is in between (1 − R1).Q1 and Q1) and for product 2 demand is less than
(1−R2).Q2 and all unsold product 1, R2.Q2 amount of product 2 are returned
to the manufacturer, and profit expression is;
pie = p1x + p2y + R2Q2s2 + (Q1 − x)s1 (e)
In region f , (1−R1)Q1 ≤ x ≤ Q1, (1−R2)Q2 ≤ y ≤ Q2, demand for product
1 is in between (1−R1).Q1 and Q1) and for product 2 is in between (1−R2).Q2
and Q2) and all unsold product 1 and 2 are returned to the manufacturer, and
profit expression is;
pif = p1x + p2y + (Q1 − x)s1 + (Q2 − y)s2 (f)
In region g, x ≥ Q1, Q2 − (y + a(x − Q1)) > R2Q2, demand for product
1 exceeds its inventory level but the excess demand can be fully satisfied by
product 2 and R2.Q2 amount of product 2 is returned to the manufacturer,
and profit expression is;
pig = p2y + p2(a(x−Q1)) + R2Q2s2 + p1Q1 (g)
In region h, x ≥ Q1, Q2 − (y + a(x − Q1)) < R2Q2, y + a(x − Q1) < Q2,
demand for product 1 exceeds its inventory level but the excess demand can
be fully satisfied by product 2 and all unsold amount of product 2 is returned
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to the manufacturer, and profit expression is;
pih = p1Q1 + p2(y + a(x−Q1)) + (Q2 − y − a(x−Q1))s2 (h)
In region i, x ≥ Q1, y ≥ Q2, demands for both products are greater than
their inventory levels, and profit expression is;
pii = p1Q1 + p2Q2 (i)
In region j, y ≥ Q2, x + b(y − Q2) < Q1, x < Q1, demand for product 2
exceeds its inventory level and the excess demand can only be partially satisfied
by product 1, and profit expression is;
pij = p1Q1 + p2Q2 (j)
Finally, in region k, x ≥ Q1, y + a(x − Q1) < Q2, y < Q2, demand for
product 1 exceeds its inventory level and the excess demand can only be
partially satisfied by product 2, and profit expression is;
pik = p1Q1 + p2Q2 (k)
Retailer‘s expected profit expression, EPR(Q1, Q2), is obtained by integrat-
ing these profit expressions over their respective regions plus −d1Q1 − d2Q2.
The proof of this expression is given in the Appendix B.
Proposition 2.2.1:
Under the assumed buyback and return contract the retailers expected
profit is given by:



























[Q1 − x− b(y −Q2)]s1dF (x)dG(y)















G(R2Q2 − a(x−Q1))dF (x) (2)
In the above expressions Ri = 1−Ri, i = 1, 2.
2.3 Manufacturer Expected Profit
Now, we consider the expected profit of the manufacturer under the buyback
contract with the retailer. Figure D.2 in Appendix-D can also be used to
derive the expected profit of the manufacturer. The paid money to the retailer
for returned products are calculated for each subcases. Then the derivation,
EPM(Q1, Q2), is based on considering the profit earned Q1(d1−c1)+Q2(d2−c2)
minus the money paid to retailer for returned products calculated in each region
in Figure D.2 in Appendix-D.
Note that since
EPT (Q1, Q2) = EPR(Q1, Q2) + EPM(Q1, Q2)
We have
EPM(Q1, Q2) = EPT (Q1, Q2)− EPR(Q1, Q2)
However, for verification purposes we also separately derived this expression as
described below.
We have the following expressions for the money paid back to the retailer
in different regions;
pia = R1Q1s1 + R2Q2s2 (a)
pib = R1Q1s1 + (Q2 − y)s2 (b)
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL MODEL 19
pic = R1Q1s1 (c)
pid = (Q1 − x− b(y −Q2))s1 (d)
pie = R2Q2s2 + (Q1 − x)s1 (e)
pif = (Q1 − x)s1 + (Q2 − y)s2 (f)
pig = R2Q2s2 (g)
pih = (Q2 − y − a(x−Q1))s2 (h)
In region i, j and k no money is returned to the retailer. Therefore, we
have:
pii = pij = pik = 0
Manufacturer‘s expected profit, EPM(Q1, Q2), is obtained by subtracting
the total integrated profit expressions over their respective regions from Q1(d1−
c1) + Q2(d2 − c2) as follows:
Proposition 2.3.1:
Under the buyback and return contracts, the manufacturer‘s expected profit
is given by:





























G(R2Q2 − a(x−Q1))dF (x) (3)
Proof of this expression is given in Appendix C.
Chapter 3
Special Cases
In this section, we consider several special cases and investigate the conditions
under which channel coordination is achieved.
We mainly focus on special cases in terms of the return fractions,
substitution probabilities and credits paid for the returned items. Several cases
corresponding to full or partial credits; full or partial substitution among the
two products and one-way or two-way substitution are inspected separately. In
all the special cases we use the same approach for finding the conditions under
which the channel coordination is achieved. Firstly, total supply chain expected
profit, EPT (Q1, Q2) , and retailer‘s expected profit, EPR(Q1, Q2), are written
for the special values of a, b, R1, R2. Then the conditions are investigated for
which the optimal order quantities that maximize EPR(Q1, Q2) are equal to
the production quantities of the manufacturer that maximize EPT (Q1, Q2).
In the following discussions we assume that EPT (Q1, Q2) is unimodal in




2) that maximizes the channel
profit EPT (Q1, Q2). Concavity of the total profit function is proved by Parlar
and Goyal [7]. Hence the analysis is based on the first order conditions.
Namely, the conditions under which (Qc1, Q
c
2) becomes equal to the optimal
order quantities of the retailer are investigated. In some special cases of the
contracts, the first order conditions of the retailer is satisfied only when order
20
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quantities are infinite, and in this case we say that the system is sub-optimal.
Otherwise if the first order conditions are satisfied at finite order quantities,
we assume that they are also optimal quantities. Similarly, when infeasible
conditions are required for the channel coordination, (such as zero profit of the
manufacturer or the retailer) we refer to this as system sub-optimality.
3.1 Case-1: Full returns with partial credit
and no substitution
Suppose the retailer is allowed to return all unsold products to the
manufacturer and there is no substitution between the two products then we
have the following results;
Proposition 3.1.1 :




2 be the optimal production
quantities of the manufacturer. Then channel coordination is achieved if the














If the manufacturer produces Q1, Q2 and sells to the public directly his
expected profit, EPT (Q1, Q2), will be given by:
EPT (Q1, Q2) =-p1
∫ Q1
0 F (x)d(x) + (p2 − c2)Q2-p2
∫ Q2
0 G(y)d(y) + (p1 − c1)Q1
Setting the derivatives with respect to Q1 and Q2 equal to zero, we obtain;
0 = p1 − c1 − p1F (Q
c
1) (3)
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0 = p2 − c2 − p2G(Q
c
2) (4)
Note that the second derivatives are given by −p1f(Q1) and −p2f(Q2) which
indicates that EPT (Q1, Q2) is concave in Q1, Q2. For this special case we also
have;
EPR(Q1, Q2) = − p1
∫ Q1
0

























[Q2 − y]s2dG(y)dF (x)
When the derivatives are set to zero, we have;
0 = p1 − d1 − p1F (Q1) + s1F (Q1) (5)
0 = p2 − d2 − p2G(Q2) + s2G(Q2) (6)
The second derivatives are obtained as −(p1−s1)f(Q1) and −(p2−s2)g(Q2)
respectively and their non-negativity imply the concavity of the retailer‘s profit.














1- When there is no substitution as in this case, the result for two product
is same as obtained for one product in Pasternack(11), except that we have
two independent products.
2- The policy of a manufacturer allowing unlimited returns for full credit is
system suboptimal.
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3- The policy of a manufacturer allowing no returns is system suboptimal
4- A policy of which allows for unlimited returns at partial credit will be
system optimal for appropriately chosen values of p1, c1, d1, s1, p2, c2, d2 and s2
as the condition above (1) and (2)
3.2 Case-2: Full returns with partial credit
and one-way full substitution
Now, we consider the following special case: The retailer returns all unsold
products to the manufacturer with partial credit and only one of the products
is substituted with the other with certainty. Then, we have the following result;
Proposition 3.2.1:
Let a = 1, b = 0, R1 = 1 and R2 = 1. Then, to achieve channel coordination
the following equality must hold:
F (Qc1) =




0 < c1 − c2 < p1 (8)
where Qc1 is the centralized solution that satisfies (9) and (10)
Proof :
In this case, EPT (Q1, Q2) , will be given by:
EPT (Q1, Q2) = − p1.
∫ Q1
0




G(y).F (Q1 + Q2 − y).d(y) + (p1 − c1).Q1
CHAPTER 3. SPECIAL CASES 24





F (x, t)d(x) = F (β(t), t).β
′









Setting the first partial derivatives of EPT (Q1, Q2) to zero we obtain;







2 − y).d(y) (9)









2 − y).d(y) (10)









Note that in order that (11) is satisfied and feasible (8) must hold.
For this special case the retailer‘s expected profit, EPR(Q1, Q2), will be
given by :
EPR(Q1, Q2) = − p1.
∫ Q1
0

























[Q2 − y + Q1 − x]s2dG(y)dF (x)
The partial derivatives set to zero result in:












0 = − p2.
∫ Q2
0
f(Q1 + Q2 − y).G(y).d(y)− p2F (Q1)G(Q2)
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Solving (9), (12), (10) and (13) results in;






s2dG(y)dF (x) + c1 − d1 (14)






s2dG(y)dF (x) + c2 − d2 (15)
From which we obtain;
F (Qc1)[s1 − s2G(Q
c
2)] = c2 − d2 − (c1 − d1) (16)
(11) and (16) result in (7).
3.3 Case-3: One-way full substitution with no
returns
We now consider the special case with a = 1, b = 0, R1 = R2 = 0.
Proposition 3.3.1:
Under one-way full substitution with no returns R1 = 0 and R2 = 0,
channel coordination requires c1 = d1 and c2 = d2. Hence, the system is
suboptimal, unless the manufacturer makes zero profit.
Proof :
In this case, EPT (Q1, Q2) , is given by:
EPT (Q1, Q2) = − p1.
∫ Q1
0




G(y).F (Q1 + Q2 − y).d(y) + (p1 − c1).Q1
From this expression we obtain;







2 − y).d(y) (17)









2 − y).d(y) (18)
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Also, we have;
EPR(Q1, Q2) = − p1.
∫ Q1
0




F (Q1 + Q2 − y).G(y).d(y) + (p1 − d1).Q1
and;
0 = p1 − d1 − p1F (Q1)− p2
∫ Q2
0
f(Q1 + Q2 − y).G(y).d(y) (19)
0 = p2 − d2 − p2F (Q1)G(Q2)− p2
∫ Q2
0
f(Q1 + Q2 − y).G(y).d(y) (20)
Equations (17), (19), (18) and (20) imply that c1 = d1, c2 = d2 which is not
feasible.
3.4 Case-4: Full returns with full credit and
one-way full substitution
This is a special case of case-2 where s1 = d1, s2 = d2.
Proposition 3.4.1:
Suppose a = 1, b = 0, R1 = 1, R2 = 1, s1 = d1 and s2 = d2. Then the
system is suboptimal.
Proof :
This is a special case of case 2. Consider expressions given by (12) and (13)
for the first order conditions of the retailer‘s profit. Letting s1 = d1, s2 = d2,
(12) and (13) becomes;
0 = (p1 − s1)(1− F (Q1))− p2
∫ Q2
0





G(Q1 + Q2 − x)dF (x) (21)
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0 = (p2 − s2)(1− F (Q1)G(Q2))− p2
∫ Q2
0









f(Q1 + Q2 − y)G(y)d(y) =
∫ Q1+Q2
Q1
G(Q1 + Q2 − u)f(u)d(u)
(22) is equivalent to
1− F (Q1)G(Q2) =
∫ Q1+Q2
Q1





dF (u) = 1− F (Q1)
which is impossible since 1− F (Q1)G(Q2) ≥ 1− F (Q1) except when Q1 =
Q2 = ∞. Hence, the first order conditions of the retailer are satisfied only for
infinite order quantities.
3.5 Case-5: Two-way full substitution with no
returns
We now consider the special case with a = 1, b = 1, R1 = R2 = 0.
Proposition 3.5.1:
Suppose a = 1, b = 1, R1 = 0 and R2 = 0. Then to achieve the channel
coordination the following condition should be satisfied:
c1 = d1
c2 = d2
So, the policy of a manufacturer allowing no returns with two-way full
substitution is system suboptimal, unless the manufacturer makes zero profit.
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Proof :
In this case, EPT (Q1, Q2) , will be given by:
EPT (Q1, Q2) = − p1.
∫ Q1
0




G(y).F (Q1 + Q2 − y).d(y) + (p1 − c1).Q1
Then we have the following conditions for optimality;













F (x).g(Qc1 + Q
c
2 − x).d(x) (23)













F (x).g(Qc1 + Q
c
2 − x).d(x) (24)
Also,
EPR(Q1, Q2) = − p1.
∫ Q1
0




G(Q1 + Q2 − y).G(y).d(y) + (p1 − d1).Q1
and after differentiating;
0 = p1 − d1 − p1F (Q1)G(Q2)− p2.
∫ Q2
0




g(Q1 + Q2 − x).F (x).d(x) (25)
0 = p2 − d2 − p2F (Q1)G(Q2) +−p2.
∫ Q2
0




g(Q1 + Q2 − x).F (x).d(x) (26)
By using the equations (23), (24), (25) and (26) we found the following
equations to achieve the channel coordination :
c1 = d1
c2 = d2
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So, the policy of a manufacturer allowing no returns with two-way full
substitution is system suboptimal.
3.6 Case-6: Full return with partial credit and
two-way full substitution
Now, we consider the following special case:
The retailer returns all unsold products to the manufacturer with partial
credit and two of the products are substituted with each other with certainty.
Then we have the following result;
Proposition 3.6.1:
Let a = 1, b = 1, R1 = 1 and R2 = 1. Then the following conditions should
be satisfied to achieve channel coordination:
c2 − p2 − (c1 − p1)
p1 − p2
=
c2 − d2 − (c1 − d1)
s1 − s2
(27)
provided that both sides of the inequality are between zero and one. This
means that if c1 < c2 then p1 < p2.
Proof :
In this case, EPT (Q1, Q2) , will be given by:
EPT (Q1, Q2) = − p1.
∫ Q1
0




G(y).F (Q1 + Q2 − y).d(y) + (p1 − c1).Q1
By differentiating EPT (Q1, Q2);













F (x).g(Qc1 + Q
c
2 − x).d(x) (28)
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F (x).g(Qc1 + Q
c
2 − x).d(x) (29)
By using (28) and (29) we obtain the following condition for the central




c2 + p1 − c1 − p2
p1 − p2
(30)
For this special case the retailer‘s expected profit, EPR(Q1, Q2), will be
given by the following formula :
EPR(Q1, Q2) = − p1.
∫ Q1
0

























[Q2 − y + Q1 − x]s2dG(y)dF (x)
To find the optimal order quantity for the retailer, Q1, Q2 , we differentiate
EPR(Q1, Q2) with respect to Q1, Q2 and set this amount equal to 0. This gives
the following two expressions:





















F (x).g(Q1 + Q2 − x).d(x)
(31)
0 = − p2F (Q1)G(Q2) + p2 − d2 + s2F (Q1)G(Q2)





















F (x).g(Q1 + Q2 − x).d(x)
(32)
Moreover, the following condition found from the equations (28), (29), (31)




c2 − d2 − (c1 − d1)
s1 − s2
(33)
provided that right hand side of (33) is in (0,1).
(30) and (33) result in (27).
Remarks:
• Result in Proposition 3.6.1 indicates that the channel coordinating
parameters are distribution free. That is they are independent of the
demand distributions.
• Channel coordination requires that if the profit of the manufacturer for
product i is higher than that for product j, then it must hold that si > sj
and the difference between the profits of the two products must ne less
than the difference between the return credits. These are quantified by
the conditions di− ci > dj − cj, si > sj and (di− ci)+ (dj − cj) < si− sj.
3.7 Case-7: Full return with full credit and
two-way full substitution
Case-7 is a special case of case-6 where s1 = d1, s2 = d2.
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Proposition 3.7.1:
Let a = 1, b = 1, R1 = 1, R2 = 1, s1 = d1 and s2 = d2.
Then the system is suboptimal.
Proof :
When s1 = d1, s2 = d2, (31) and (32) becomes;
0 = − p2.
∫ Q2
0
f(Q1 + Q2 − y).G(y).d(y)










s2G(Q1 + Q2 − y)dF (y)− p1
∫ Q1
0
F (x).g(Q1 + Q2 − x).d(x)
(34)
0 = − p2.
∫ Q2
0
f(Q1 + Q2 − y).G(y).d(y)










s2G(Q1 + Q2 − y)dF (y)− p1
∫ Q1
0






F (Q1 + Q2 − y)dG(y) =
∫ Q1
0




G(Q1 + Q2 − y)dF (y) =
∫ Q2
0
G(x)f(Q1 + Q2 − x).d(x)
Hence, (34) becomes;
0 = − (p2 − s2)
∫ Q2
0
f(Q1 + Q2 − y)G(y)d(y) + (p1 − s1)(1− F (Q1)G(Q2))
− (p1 − s1)
∫ Q1
0
F (x)g(Q1 + Q2 − x)d(x)





































G(Q1 + Q2 − y)dF (y)
= P (X + Y < Q1 + Q2) + [
p2 − s2
p1 − s1
− 1]P (X + Y < Q1 + Q2, X > Q1)
(36)
If p2 − s2 < p1 − s1, then (36) is not satisfied unless Q1 = Q2 = ∞.









g(Q1 + Q2 − y)F (y)d(y)
(37)
Using the same argument as above, we see that if p1 − s1 < p2 − s2 then
(37) can not be satisfied unless Q1 = Q2 = ∞.




In this chapter, we present the results of our numerical study. We have done
the numerical studies for case-2 and case-6 as described in Chapter-3. In all
these cases, where coordination is achieved, we have R1 = R2 = 1. Substitution
probabilities (a,b) for the two products are, either 0 or 1. Therefore, effect of
substitution on coordination can be seen in the results. Demand distribution
for both products, is taken as negative binomial with parameters ri : 5, pi :
0.25, i=1,2. Note that, if Y is a negative binomial random variable then the
probability mass function p(y), variance V (Y ) and the expectation E(Y ) are
as follows. For 0 < p < 1;
p(y) =

 y − 1
r − 1

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4.1 Channel Coordinating Transfer Payments
and Buyback Credits
In this part of the numerical study we consider case 2 and case 6 and investigate
the coordinating values of the transfer payments d1, d2, and the buyback credits
s1, s2. To this end, as we indicated above, we first set c1 = 3, c2 = 2, p1 = 9 and
p2 = 7 and searched for the optimal production quantity of the manufacturer
by maximizing the expression, EPT (Q1, Q2), for the channel profit. We denote
the optimal quantities by Qc1, Q
c
2. We then searched for the transfer payments
and buyback credits that achieve channel coordination using the results of
Proposition 3.2.1 and 3.6.1. The results for case 2 are provided in Tables E.1
to E.3. The optimal quantities are found as Q1 = 14 and Q2 = 31. This shows
that the inventory level of the good which is substituted for the other product
2 is greater than the other product, as expected. Moreover, we have found that
the total expected chain profit, EPT (Q1, Q2) is 177.808. Similarly, the results
for case 6 is provided in Tables E.4 to E.6. The optimal quantities for this case
are Q1 = 30 and Q2 = 13. Similar to case 2 the quantity of product 1 is greater
than that of product 2. This is explained by the fact that the price of product
1 (p1 = 9) is greater than the price of product 2 (p2 = 7). Total expected chain
profit for case 6 is found as 183.539 which is greater than the profit in case-2.
This is understandable, since in case 6, substitution occurs in both direction.
As d1, d2 increase, manufacturer‘s profit increase. When we compare Tables
E.1 to E.3 and E.4 to E.6 we see that as d1, d2 increase, the percentage share
of the retailer decrease substantially as expected. On the other hand, as s1, s2
increase, the retailer‘s profit and share also increase. As manufacturer‘s profit
margin for both products increases, see Table E.19, then retailer‘s profit share
decreases as seen in Tables E.9, E.10, E.11, E.12, E.13 and E.14. At the same
time, wee see that retailer‘s profit margin decreases as manufacturer‘s profit
margin increases.
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4.2 Further Analysis with Fixed Q1 and Q2
In this part of the numerical study we investigate the impact of the price
changes on the retailer‘s profit share for fixed Q1, Q2 levels, which can be
realistic if there is production capacity. For this purpose, we considered Q1, Q2
values of 13,20,27 that correspond to average, below and above average demand
cases. Other parameter values are taken as follows: c1 = 3, c2 = 2. In case 2,
d1 = 4.5, d2 = 3.5 and d1 = 4.5, d2 = 3 in case-6. The first product is sold to
the retailer with 50% profit by the manufacturer in case-2 and case-6 and the
second product with 75% profit in case-2, 50% profit in case-6.
In case 2, when Q1 = Q2 = 13, positive profit for the retailer starts with
prices 5.50 and 3.516 for product 1 and 2 respectively and the corresponding
percentage profit of the retailer is 19.5 and the total channel profit is 47.95.
As prices increase both the total profit and the retailer‘s percentage share
increase, reaching to about 80 percent share when the goods are sold about
four times their cost. When tables E.9 to E.11 are compared, we see that the
total profit increases substantially. Same observation also holds in comparison
of the Tables E.12 to E.14, where Q1 = 20.
Case-6 corresponds to two way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns. Hence both products are substituted with each other. In this case,
we observe that coordination is possible for (Q1, Q2) values given by (20,20),
(20,27), (27,20), (27,27), all of which are above mean demand levels, which
makes sense due to full substitution of both products. From Tables E.15 and
E.18 we observe that the total profits and the share of the retailer are very
close to each other with similar prices and slightly different s1, s2 values. When
these results are compared to the case with Q1 = 20, Q2 = 27, we note that for
smaller price pairs, the total profit and the share of the retailer is much larger.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this study, a simple supply chain structure with a single retailer and
a manufacturer, is considered for two perishable products which can be
substituted for each other with fixed probabilities. The retailer is also allowed
to return some products to the manufacturer according to the contract between
the retailer and the manufacturer. The aim is to analyse the model so as to
achieve channel coordination. By channel coordination, we refer to a case
where the order quantity of the retailer is equal to the production quantity of
a manufacturer that produces as well as sells the products. This means that the
order quantities making the total expected channel profit maximum equals to
the order quantity that makes the retailer‘s expected profit maximum as well.
Using the model notations and assumptions, we first derive the expressions
for the total expected channel profit, manufacturers expected profit and the
retailers expected profit under general model parameters. We then investigated
the special cases for channel coordination. These special cases are full returns
with partial credit and no substitution; full returns with partial credit and
one-way full substitution; one-way full substitution with no returns (only one
product is substituted for other); full returns with full credit and one-way full
substitution; two-way full substitution with no returns; full return with partial
credit and two-way full substitution and full return with full credit and two-
way full substitution. A similar study with a single product was given by
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Pasternack [9], where it was found that channel coordination was not achieved
with full returns and full credits. This is consistent with our result. We have
found that channel coordination is not achieved for no returns cases. We have
done the numerical studies with negative binomial demand distribution. From
our results, we observed that the share of the retailer is substantially increased
with two-way full substitution.
This study can be extended for multi products, multi-period , correlated
demand and partial substitution as future research directions.
Appendix A
The calculation of the
EPT (Q1, Q2)
The derivation of the formula is based on considering the profit in several
subcases as seen in Figure D.1. The cost of producing Q1 units of product 1
and Q2 units of product 2, −c1Q1−c2Q2 , is summed up with the profit obtained
by the integration of profit expressions over their respective regions as seen in
Figure D.1 to obtain the formula, EPT (Q1, Q2) . The profit expressions in
each region is as follows:
pia = p1x + p2y x ≤ Q1, y ≤ Q2 (a)
pib = p2y+p2ax+Q1(p1−p2a) x ≥ Q1, y ≤ Q2, a(x−Q1) < Q2−y (b)
pic = p1Q1 + p2Q2 x ≥ Q1, y ≤ Q2, a(x−Q1) > Q2 − y (c)
pid = p1Q1 + p2Q2 x ≥ Q1, y ≥ Q2 (d)
pie = p1Q1 + p2Q2 x ≤ Q1, y ≥ Q2, Q1 − x < b(y −Q2) (e)
pif = p1x + p1by + Q2(p2 − p1b) x ≤ Q1, y ≥ Q2, Q1 − x > b(y −Q2) (f)
The same parts in pia, pib, pic, pid, pie and pif are grouped according to regions
in Figure D.1. As a result,
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G(Q2 + a(Q1 − x))dF (x) =







p1Q1 + p2Q2 is in region (d ∪ e ∪ c), and each part is integrated seperately
as follows:








dG(y)dF (x) = (p1Q1 + p2Q2)F (Q1)G(Q2) (9)
































The sum of (9), (10) and (11) gives the following integral part.














EPT (Q1, Q2) is obtained by the sum of (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (12) and
−c1Q1 − c2Q2.
Appendix B
The calculation of the
EPR(Q1, Q2)
The derivation of the formula is based on considering the profit in several
subcases as seen in Figure D.2. The paid money to the manufacturer ,−d1Q1−
d2Q2, is summed up with the profit obtained by the integration of the profit
expressions over their respective regions as seen in Figure D.2 to obtain the
formula, EPR(Q1, Q2) . The profit expressions in each region is as follows:
x ≤ (1− R1)Q1, y ≤ (1− R2)Q2
pia = p1x + p2y + R1Q1s1 + R2Q2s2 (a)
x ≤ (1− R1)Q1, (1− R2)Q2 ≤ y ≤ Q2
pib = p1x + p2y + R1Q1s1 + (Q2 − y)s2 (b)
y ≥ Q2, Q1 − (x + b(y −Q2)) > R1Q1
pic = p1x + p1(b(y −Q2)) + R1Q1s1 + p2Q2 (c)
y ≥ Q2, Q1 − (x + b(y −Q2)) < R1Q1, x + b(y −Q2) < Q1
pid = p2Q2 + p1(x + b(y −Q2)) + (Q1 − x− b(y −Q2))s1 (d)
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y ≤ (1− R2)Q2, (1−R1)Q1 ≤ x ≤ Q1
pie = p1x + p2y + R2Q2s2 + (Q1 − x)s1 (e)
(1− R1)Q1 ≤ x ≤ Q1, (1− R2)Q2 ≤ y ≤ Q2
pif = p1x + p2y + (Q1 − x)s1 + (Q2 − y)s2 (f)
x ≥ Q1, Q2 − (y + a(x−Q1)) > R2Q2
pig = p2y + p2(a(x−Q1)) + R2Q2s2 + p1Q1 (g)
x ≥ Q1, Q2 − (y + a(x−Q1)) < R2Q2, y + a(x−Q1) < Q2
pih = p1Q1 + p2(y + a(x−Q1)) + (Q2 − y − a(x−Q1))s2 (h)
x ≥ Q1, y ≥ Q2
pii = p1Q1 + p2Q2 (i)
y ≥ Q2, x + b(y −Q2) < Q1, x < Q1
pij = p1Q1 + p2Q2 (j)
x ≥ Q1, y + a(x−Q1) < Q2, y < Q2
pik = p1Q1 + p2Q2 (k)
The same parts in pia, pib, pic, pid, pie, pif , pig, pih, pii, pij and pik are grouped
according to regions in Figure-D.2. As a result,
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R1Q1s1dF (x)dG(y) = R1Q1s1F (R1.Q1)G(Q2) (3)
Similarly, R2Q2s2 in region (a ∪ e) is symmetric to R1Q1s1.
R2Q2s2G(R2.Q2)F (Q1) (4)










(Q1 − x)s1 in region (b ∪ f) which is symmetric to (Q2 − y)s2










(p1Q1 + p2Q2)dG(y)dF (x) = (p1Q1 + p2Q2)G(Q2)F (Q1) (7)
The sum of (1),(2),(3),(4),(5),(6) and (7) gives the following integral part
of EPR(Q1, Q2):
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p2Q2dF (x)dG(y) = p2Q2G(Q2)F (Q1) (9)











F (Q1 − (b(y −Q2)))dG(y) (10)
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F (R1.Q1 − b(y −Q2))dG(y) (12)






[Q1 − x− b(y −Q2)]s1dF (x)dG(y) (13)
The integral of pic, pid and pij on the regions is the sum of (9), (10), (11),






[Q1 − x− b(y −Q2)]s1dF (x)dG(y)














F (R1.Q1 − b(y −Q2))dG(y) (14)







[Q2 − y − a(x−Q1)]s2dG(y)dF (x)
(p1Q1 + p2Q2)G(Q2)− (p1Q1 + p2Q2)F (Q1)G(Q2)














G(R2.Q2 − a(x−Q1))dF (x) (15)
The formula EPR(Q1, Q2) is the sum of (8), (14) and (15) and−d1Q1−d2Q2.
Appendix C
The calculation of the
EPM (Q1, Q2)
The derivation of the formula is based on considering the paid money for
returned products in several subcases as seen in Figure D.2. The cost of
producing Q1 units of product 1 and Q2 units of product 2 is subtracted
from the earned money from selling Q1 units of product 1 and Q2 units
of product 2 to the retailer, Q1(d1 − c1) + Q2(d2 − c2). Then, the paid
money for returned products is calculated by the integration of the profit
expressions over their respective regions as seen in Figure D.2. The term
Q1(d1 − c1) + Q2(d2 − c2) minus the paid money term for returned products
gives the formula of EPM(Q1, Q2).
x ≤ (1− R1)Q1, y ≤ (1− R2)Q2
pia = R1Q1s1 + R2Q2s2 (a)
x ≤ (1− R1)Q1, (1− R2)Q2 ≤ y ≤ Q2
pib = R1Q1s1 + (Q2 − y)s2 (b)
y ≥ Q2, Q1 − (x + b(y −Q2)) > R1Q1
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pic = R1Q1s1 (c)
y ≥ Q2, Q1 − (x + b(y −Q2)) < R1Q1, x + b(y −Q2) < Q1
pid = (Q1 − x− b(y −Q2))s1 (d)
y ≤ (1− R2)Q2, (1−R1)Q1 ≤ x ≤ Q1
pie = R2Q2s2 + (Q1 − x)s1 (e)
(1− R1)Q1 ≤ x ≤ Q1, (1− R2)Q2 ≤ y ≤ Q2
pif = (Q1 − x)s1 + (Q2 − y)s2 (f)
x ≥ Q1, Q2 − (y + a(x−Q1)) > R2Q2
pig = R2Q2s2 (g)
x ≥ Q1, Q2 − (y + a(x−Q1)) < R2Q2, y + a(x−Q1) < Q2
pih = (Q2 − y − a(x−Q1))s2 (h)
x ≥ Q1, y ≥ Q2
pii = 0 (i)
y ≥ Q2, x + b(y −Q2) < Q1, x < Q1
pij = 0 (j)
x ≥ Q1, y + a(x−Q1) < Q2, y < Q2
pik = 0 (k)





R1Q1s1dF (x)dG(y) = R1Q1s1F (R1.Q1)G(Q2) (1)
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R2Q2s2dG(y)dF (x) = R2Q2s2G(R2.Q2)F (Q1) (2)









(Q1 − x)s1 in region (e ∪ f) is symmetric to (3)










[Q1 − x− b(y −Q2)]s1dF (x)dG(y) (5)










F (R1.Q1 − b(y −Q2))dG(y) (6)






[Q2 − y − a(x−Q1)]s2dG(y)dF (x) (7)





G(R2.Q2 − a(x−Q1))dF (x) (8)
The formula EPM(Q1, Q2) is equal to the term Q1(d1 − c1) + Q2(d2 − c2)
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Figure D.3: Case-2 for Qc1 = 14, Q
c
1 = 31

















Figure D.4: Case-6 for Qc1 = 30, Q
c
1 = 13
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Figure D.5: Case-2 for Q1 = 13, Q1 = 20
















Figure D.6: Case-2 for Q1 = 13, Q1 = 27
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Figure D.7: Case-2 for Q1 = 20, Q1 = 20
















Figure D.8: Case-2 for Q1 = 20, Q1 = 27
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Figure D.9: Case-6 for Q1 = 20, Q1 = 20
















Figure D.10: Case-6 for Q1 = 20, Q1 = 27
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Figure D.11: Case-6 for Q1 = 27, Q1 = 20












Figure D.12: Case-6 for Q1 = 27, Q1 = 27














s1 s2 EPR percent.ret.profit
1,5 0.175801 129.302 73,0795
1,75 0.472823 131.416 74,2741
2 0.769848 133.529 75,4688
2,25 1,06687 135.643 76,6634
2,5 1,3639 137.757 77,858
2,75 1,66092 139.871 79,0527
3 1,95794 141.984 80,2473
3,25 2,25497 144.098 81,4419
3,5 2,55199 146.212 82,6366
3,75 2,84901 148.325 83,8312
4 3,14604 150.439 85,0259
Table E.1: Case-2:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full returns
for Qc1 = 14, Q
c
2 = 31, d1 = 4.5, d2 = 3
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s1 s2 EPR percent.ret.profit
1,5 0.175801 64,802 36,6251
1,75 0.472823 66,9157 37,8197
2 0.769848 69,0294 39,0144
2,25 1,06687 71,1431 40,209
2,5 1,3639 73,2568 41,4036
2,75 1,66092 75,3705 42,5983
3 1,95794 77,4842 43,7929
3,25 2,25497 79,5979 44,9875
3,5 2,55199 81,7117 46,1822
3,75 2,84901 83,8254 47,3768
4 3,14604 85,9391 48,5714
4,25 3,44306 88,0528 49,7661
4,5 3,74008 90,1665 50,9607
4,75 4,03711 92,2802 52,1553
5 4,33413 94,3939 53,35
Table E.2: Case-2:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full returns
for Qc1 = 14, Q
c
2 = 31, d1 = 6, d2 = 4.5
s1 s2 EPR percent.ret.profit
1,5 0.175801 21,802 12,3222
1,75 0.472823 23,9157 13,5168
2 0.769848 26,0294 14,7114
2,25 1,06687 28,1431 15,9061
2,5 1,3639 30,2568 17,1007
2,75 1,66092 32,3705 18,2953
3 1,95794 34,4842 19,49
3,25 2,25497 36,5979 20,6846
3,5 2,55199 38,7116 21,8792
3,75 2,84901 40,8254 23,0739
4 3,14604 42,9391 24,2685
4,25 3,44306 45,0528 25,4631
4,5 3,74008 47,1665 26,6578
4,75 4,03711 49,2802 27,8524
5 4,33413 51,3939 29,047
5,25 4,63116 53,5076 30,2417
5,5 4,92818 55,6213 31,4363
5,75 5,2252 57,735 32,6309
6 5,52223 59,8487 33,8256
Table E.3: Case-2:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full returns
for Qc1 = 14, Q
c
2 = 31, d1 = 7, d2 = 5.5
s1 s2 EPR percent.ret.profit
3 0.116810 142.634 78,1321
3,25 0.366808 143.903 78,8273
3,5 0.616807 145.173 79,5224
3,75 0.866809 146.442 80,2176
4 1,11681 147.711 80,9128
Table E.4: Case-6:Two-way full substitution with partial credit and full returns
for Qc1 = 30, Q
c
2 = 13, d1 = 4.5, d2 = 3
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s1 s2 EPR percent.ret.profit
3 0.116810 82,6343 45,2653
3,25 0.366808 83,9034 45,9605
3,5 0.616807 85,1725 46,6557
3,75 0.866809 86,4416 47,3509
4 1,11681 87,7107 48,0461
4,25 1,36681 88,9798 48,7413
4,5 1,61681 90,2489 49,4365
4,75 1,86681 91,518 50,1316
5 2,11681 92,7871 50,8268
Table E.5: Case-6:Two-way full substitution with partial credit and full returns
for Qc1 = 30, Q
c
2 = 13, d1 = 6, d2 = 4.5
s1 s2 EPR percent.ret.profit
3 0.116810 42,6343 23,3542
3,25 0.366808 43,9034 24,0494
3,5 0.616807 45,1725 24,7446
3,75 0.866809 46,4416 25,4397
4 1,11681 47,7107 26,1349
4,25 1,36681 48,9798 26,8301
4,5 1,61681 50,2489 27,5253
4,75 1,86681 51,518 28,2205
5 2,11681 52,7871 28,9157
5,25 2,36681 54,0562 29,6109
5,5 2,61681 55,3253 30,306
5,75 2,86681 56,5944 31,0012
6 3,11681 57,8635 31,6964
Table E.6: Case-6:Two-way full substitution with partial credit and full returns
for Qc1 = 30, Q
c
2 = 13, d1 = 7, d2 = 5.5
Q1 Q2 s1 s2
13 13 0,3 1,46
13 20 0,3 0,51
13 20 0,6 1,03
13 20 0,9 1,54
13 27 0,6 0,71
13 27 0,9 1,07
13 27 1,5 1,78
20 13 0,3 1,46
20 20 0,3 0,51
20 20 0,6 1,03
20 20 0,9 1,54
20 27 0,6 0,71
20 27 0,9 1,07
20 27 1,5 1,78
Table E.7: Parameter sets for case-2
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Q1 Q2 s1 s2
20 20 2,1 0,64
20 20 2,4 0,94
20 20 2,7 1,24
20 27 2,1 1,08
20 27 2,4 1,38
20 27 2,7 1,68
27 20 1,8 0,78
27 20 2,4 1,38
27 20 2,7 1,68
27 27 1,8 1,09
27 27 2,1 1,39
27 27 2,4 1,69
Table E.8: Parameter sets for case-6
p1 p2 percent.ret.profit EPT EPR
5.00000 3.10147 -5.76773 36.4672 -2.10333
5.50000 3.51605 19.5634 47.9514 9.38095
6.00000 3.93063 35.1055 59.4357 20.8652
6.50000 4.34521 45.6141 70.9200 32.3495
7.00000 4.75979 53.1936 82.4043 43.8338
7.50000 5.17438 58.9188 93.8885 55.3181
8.00000 5.58896 63.3962 105.373 66.8023
8.50000 6.00354 66.9934 116.857 78.2866
9.00000 6.41812 69.9469 128.341 89.7709
9.50000 6.83270 72.4153 139.826 101.2551
10.00000 7.24728 74.5089 151.310 112.739
10.50000 7.66186 76.3072 162.794 124.224
11.0000 8.07644 77.8685 174.278 135.708
11.5000 8.49102 79.2367 185.763 147.192
12.0000 8.90560 80.4456 197.247 158.677
12.5000 9.32018 81.5215 208.731 170.161
Table E.9: Case-2a:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 13, Q2 = 13, s1 = 0.3, s2 = 1.46
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s1 = 0.3, s2 = 0.51 s1 = 0.6, s2 = 1.03 s1 = 0.9, s2 = 1.54
p1 p2 EPT EPR %PR EPR %PR EPR %PR
5,00 3,38 45,4 -3,18 -7,0 -2,3 -4,98 -1,35 -2,98
5,50 3,83 60,0 11,37 19,0 12,29 20,50 13,20 22,01
6,00 4,28 74,5 25,92 34,8 26,84 36,02 27,75 37,24
6,50 4,73 89,1 40,48 45,4 41,40 46,47 42,30 47,49
7,00 5,18 103,6 55,03 53,1 55,95 53,99 56,85 54,86
7,50 5,63 118,2 69,58 58,9 70,50 59,66 71,40 60,42
8,00 6,09 132,7 84,13 63,4 85,05 64,08 85,96 64,76
8,50 6,54 147,3 98,68 67,0 99,60 67,63 100,51 68,24
9,00 6,99 161,8 113,24 70,0 114,16 70,54 115,06 71,10
9,50 7,44 176,4 127,79 72,4 128,71 72,97 129,61 73,48
10,00 7,89 190,9 142,34 74,5 143,26 75,03 144,16 75,50
10,50 8,34 205,5 156,89 76,4 157,81 76,80 158,72 77,24
11,00 8,79 220,0 171,44 77,9 172,36 78,33 173,27 78,74
11,50 9,25 234,6 186,00 79,3 186,92 79,68 187,82 80,06
12,00 9,70 249,1 200,55 80,5 201,47 80,86 202,37 81,23
12,50 10,15 263,7 215,10 81,6 216,02 81,92 216,92 82,26
Table E.10: Case-2b:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 13, Q2 = 20
s1 = 0.6, s2 = 0.71 s1 = 0.9, s2 = 1.07 s1 = 1.5, s2 = 1.78
p1 p2 EPT EPR %PR EPR %PR EPR %PR
5,50 4,07 66,58 10,16 15,26 11,97 17,98 15,55 23,35
6,00 4,55 83,57 27,14 32,48 28,95 34,65 32,53 38,93
6,50 5,03 100,55 44,12 43,88 45,94 45,68 49,51 49,24
7,00 5,51 117,53 61,11 51,99 62,92 53,53 66,49 56,58
7,50 5,99 134,51 78,09 58,05 79,90 59,40 83,48 62,06
8,00 6,47 151,50 95,07 62,76 96,88 63,95 100,46 66,31
8,50 6,95 168,48 112,06 66,51 113,87 67,58 117,44 69,71
9,00 7,44 185,46 129,04 69,58 130,85 70,55 134,42 72,48
9,25 7,68 193,95 137,53 70,91 139,34 71,84 142,92 73,69
9,50 7,92 202,44 146,02 72,13 147,83 73,02 151,41 74,79
10,00 8,64 227,92 171,49 75,24 173,31 76,04 176,88 77,61
10,50 8,88 236,41 179,99 76,13 181,80 76,90 185,37 78,41
11,00 9,36 253,39 196,97 77,73 198,78 78,45 202,36 79,86
11,50 9,84 270,38 213,95 79,13 215,76 79,80 219,34 81,12
12,00 10,32 287,36 230,93 80,36 232,74 80,99 236,32 82,24
12,50 10,80 304,34 247,92 81,46 249,73 82,06 253,30 83,23
Table E.11: Case-2c:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 13, Q2 = 27
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p1 p2 percent.ret.profit EPT EPR
5.00 1.22147 -325.355 11.2565 -36.6235
5.50 1.45733 -113.638 22.4117 -25.4682
6.00 1.69319 -42.6399 33.5670 -14.3129
6.50 1.92904 -7.06061 44.7223 -3.15766
7.00 2.16490 14.3127 55.8775 7.99760
7.50 2.40076 28.5724 67.0328 19.1529
8.00 2.63662 38.7631 78.1881 30.3081
8.50 2.87247 46.4091 89.3433 41.4634
9.00 3.10833 52.3576 100.4986 52.6187
9.50 3.34419 57.1175 111.654 63.7739
10.00 3.58004 61.0127 122.809 74.9292
10.50 3.81590 64.2592 133.964 86.0845
11.00 4.05176 67.0066 145.120 97.2398
11.50 4.28761 69.3617 156.275 108.395
12.00 4.52347 71.4031 167.430 119.550
12.50 4.75933 73.1894 178.585 130.706
Table E.12: Case-2d:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 13, s1 = 0.3, s2 = 1.46
s1 = 0.3, s2 = 0.51 s1 = 0.6, s2 = 1.03 s1 = 0.9, s2 = 1.54
p1 p2 EPT EPR %PR EPR %PR EPR %PR
7,00 2,90 64,99 7,40 11,39 9,85 15,15 12,26 18,87
7,50 3,21 78,66 21,08 26,80 23,52 29,90 25,94 32,97
8,00 3,53 92,33 34,75 37,64 37,19 40,28 39,61 42,90
8,50 3,84 106,01 48,42 45,68 50,87 47,98 53,28 50,26
9,00 4,16 119,68 62,10 51,89 64,54 53,93 66,96 55,95
9,50 4,47 133,35 75,77 56,82 78,21 58,65 80,63 60,46
10,00 4,79 147,03 89,44 60,83 91,89 62,50 94,30 64,14
10,50 5,10 160,70 103,12 64,17 105,56 65,69 107,98 67,19
11,00 5,42 174,37 116,79 66,98 119,23 68,38 121,65 69,76
11,50 5,73 188,05 130,46 69,38 132,91 70,68 135,32 71,96
12,00 6,05 201,72 144,13 71,45 146,58 72,66 148,99 73,86
12,50 6,36 215,39 157,81 73,27 160,25 74,40 162,67 75,52
Table E.13: Case-2e:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 20
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s1 = 0.6, s2 = 0.71 s1 = 0.9, s2 = 1.07 s1 = 1.5, s2 = 1.78
p1 p2 EPT EPR %PR EPR %PR EPR %PR
7,00 3,75 75,94 12,65 16,66 16,29 21,45 23,4985 30,9435
7,50 4,16 92,33 29,04 31,45 32,68 35,40 39,89 43,203
8,00 4,57 108,72 45,43 41,79 49,07 45,14 56,2815 51,7659
8,50 4,98 125,12 61,82 49,41 65,46 52,32 72,673 58,0851
9,00 5,39 141,51 78,22 55,27 81,86 57,85 89,0645 62,9404
9,50 5,80 157,90 94,61 59,92 98,25 62,22 105,456 66,7875
10,00 6,20 174,29 111,00 63,69 114,64 65,77 121,847 69,9111
10,50 6,61 190,68 127,39 66,81 131,03 68,72 138,239 72,4976
11,00 7,02 207,07 143,78 69,44 147,42 71,19 154,63 74,6747
11,50 7,43 223,46 160,17 71,68 163,81 73,31 171,022 76,5323
12,00 7,84 239,86 176,56 73,61 180,20 75,13 187,413 78,1361
12,50 8,25 256,25 192,96 75,30 196,60 76,72 203,805 79,5347
Table E.14: Case-2f:One-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 27
s1 = 2.1, s2 = 0.64 s1 = 2.4, s2 = 0.94 s1 = 2.7, s2 = 1.24
p1 p2 EPT EPR %PR EPR %PR EPR %PR
5,00 3,48 47,40 4,69 9,89 6,29 13,26 7,88 16,63
5,50 3,98 64,78 22,07 34,07 23,67 36,54 25,27 39,00
6,00 4,48 82,16 39,45 48,02 41,05 49,96 42,65 51,91
6,50 4,98 99,55 56,84 57,10 58,43 58,70 60,03 60,31
7,00 5,48 116,93 74,22 63,48 75,82 64,84 77,41 66,21
7,50 5,98 134,31 91,60 68,20 93,20 69,39 94,80 70,58
8,00 6,48 151,70 108,99 71,85 110,58 72,90 112,18 73,95
8,50 6,98 169,08 126,37 74,74 127,97 75,69 129,56 76,63
9,00 7,48 186,46 143,75 77,10 145,35 77,95 146,95 78,81
9,50 7,98 203,84 161,14 79,05 162,73 79,83 164,33 80,62
10,00 8,48 221,23 178,52 80,70 180,12 81,42 181,71 82,14
10,50 8,98 238,61 195,90 82,10 197,50 82,77 199,10 83,44
11,00 9,48 255,99 213,29 83,32 214,88 83,94 216,48 84,56
11,50 9,98 273,38 230,67 84,38 232,27 84,96 233,86 85,55
12,00 10,48 290,76 248,05 85,31 249,65 85,86 251,25 86,41
12,50 11,00 308,14 265,44 86,14 267,03 86,66 268,63 87,18
Table E.15: Case-6a:Two-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 20
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s1 = 2.1, s2 = 1.08 s1 = 2.4, s2 = 1.38 s1 = 2.7, s2 = 1.68
p1 p2 EPT EPR %PR EPR %PR EPR %PR
6 4,03 67,26 24,86 36,96 27,9837 41,6037 31,10 46,24
6,5 4,53 85,66 43,26 50,50 46,384 54,1471 49,51 57,79
7 5,03 104,06 61,66 59,26 64,7842 62,2547 67,91 65,25
7,5 5,53 122,46 80,06 65,38 83,1845 67,926 86,31 70,47
8 6,03 140,86 98,46 69,90 101,5848 72,1157 104,71 74,33
8,5 6,53 159,26 116,86 73,38 119,985 75,3372 123,11 77,30
9 7,03 177,66 135,26 76,13 138,385 77,8915 141,51 79,65
9,5 7,53 196,07 153,66 78,37 156,786 79,9663 159,91 81,56
10 8,03 214,47 172,07 80,23 175,186 81,6851 178,31 83,14
10,25 8,28 223,67 181,27 81,04 184,386 82,4385 187,51 83,83
10,5 8,53 232,87 190,47 81,79 193,586 83,1323 196,71 84,47
11 9,03 251,27 208,87 83,13 211,986 84,3676 215,11 85,61
11,5 9,53 269,67 227,27 84,28 230,387 85,4342 233,51 86,59
12 10,03 288,07 245,67 85,28 248,787 86,3646 251,91 87,45
12,5 10,53 306,47 264,07 86,16 267,187 87,1833 270,31 88,20
Table E.16: Case-6b:Two-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 27
s1 = 1.8, s2 = 0.78 s1 = 2.4, s2 = 1.38 s1 = 2.7, s2 = 1.68
p1 p2 EPT EPR %PR EPR %PR EPR %PR
5,50 3,53 48,43 3,29 6,79 9,53 19,68 12,65 26,13
6,00 4,03 66,83 21,69 32,46 27,93 41,80 31,05 46,47
6,50 4,53 85,23 40,09 47,04 46,33 54,36 49,45 58,03
7,00 5,03 103,63 58,49 56,44 64,73 62,47 67,85 65,48
7,50 5,53 122,03 76,89 63,01 83,13 68,13 86,26 70,68
8,00 6,03 140,43 95,29 67,86 101,53 72,30 104,66 74,53
8,50 6,53 158,83 113,69 71,58 119,94 75,51 123,06 77,48
9,00 7,03 177,23 132,09 74,53 138,34 78,05 141,46 79,82
9,50 7,53 195,63 150,49 76,93 156,74 80,12 159,86 81,71
10,00 8,03 214,03 168,89 78,91 175,14 81,83 178,26 83,29
10,50 8,53 232,43 187,29 80,58 193,54 83,27 196,66 84,61
11,00 9,03 250,83 205,69 82,01 211,94 84,49 215,06 85,74
11,50 9,53 269,23 224,09 83,23 230,34 85,55 233,46 86,71
12,00 10,03 287,63 242,49 84,31 248,74 86,48 251,86 87,56
12,50 10,53 306,03 260,89 85,25 267,14 87,29 270,26 88,31
Table E.17: Case-6c:Two-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 27, Q2 = 20
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s1 = 1.8, s2 = 1.09 s1 = 2.1, s2 = 1.39 s1 = 2.4, s2 = 1.69
p1 p2 EPT EPR %PR EPR %PR EPR %PR
6,50 3,07 45,05 1,54 3,41 6,51 14,46 11,49 25,52
7,00 3,57 63,86 20,35 31,86 25,33 39,66 30,31 47,46
7,50 4,07 82,68 39,16 47,37 44,14 53,39 49,12 59,41
8,00 4,57 101,49 57,98 57,12 62,96 62,03 67,93 66,94
8,50 5,07 120,30 76,79 63,83 81,77 67,97 86,75 72,11
9,00 5,57 139,12 95,60 68,72 100,58 72,30 105,56 75,88
9,50 6,07 157,93 114,42 72,45 119,40 75,60 124,38 78,75
10,00 6,57 176,74 133,23 75,38 138,21 78,20 143,19 81,02
10,50 7,07 195,56 152,04 77,75 157,02 80,30 162,00 82,84
11,00 7,57 214,37 170,86 79,70 175,84 82,02 180,82 84,35
11,50 8,07 233,18 189,67 81,34 194,65 83,47 199,63 85,61
12,00 8,57 252,00 208,48 82,73 213,46 84,71 218,44 86,68
12,50 9,07 270,81 227,30 83,93 232,28 85,77 237,26 87,61
Table E.18: Case-6d:Two-way full substitution with partial credit and full
returns for Q1 = 27, Q2 = 27
(d1 = 4.5, d2 = 3) (d1 = 6, d2 = 4.5) (d1 = 7, d2 = 5.5)
MPM (0.5,0.5) (1,1.25) (1.33,1.75)
RPM (1,1.33) (0.5,0.55) (0.29,0.27)
Table E.19: Manufacturer‘s Profit Margin (MPM)and Retailer‘s Profit
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open ( unit=1, file=’pos2’, status= ’unknown’)
do t=1,20
s1=t*0.25
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